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the Virtues of the Character
and the Virtues of the Intellect. The former, the Moral Virtues, we have already
discussed. Our account of the latter must be prefaced by some remarks about
psychology.1.
[5]
It has been said before1 that the soul
has two parts, one rational and the other irrational. Let us now similarly divide the
rational part, and let it be assumed that there are two rational faculties, one whereby we
contemplate those things whose first principles are invariable, and one whereby we
contemplate those things which admit of variation: since, on the assumption that knowledge
is based on a likeness or affinity of some sort between subject and object, the parts of
the soul adapted to the cognition of objects that are of different kinds must themselves
differ in kind. 1.
[6]
These
two rational faculties may be designated the Scientific Faculty and the Calculative
Faculty respectively; since calculation is the same as deliberation, and deliberation is
never exercised about things that are invariable, so that the Calculative Faculty is a
separate part of the rational half of the soul.1.
[7]
We have therefore to ascertain what disposition of each of these faculties is the best,
for that will be the special virtue of each.
But the virtue of a faculty is related to the special function which that faculty
performs. 2. Now there are
three elements in the soul which control action and the attainment of truth: namely,
Sensation, Intellect,2 and
Desire.2.
[2]
Of these, Sensation never originates action, as is shown by the fact that
1 1.13.9.
2 νοῦς here bears its usual philosophic sense of the intellect, or rational part of the ‘soul,’ as a whole, whose function is διάνοια, thought in general. In chap. 6 it is given a special and restricted meaning, and this in chap. 9 is related to the popular use of the word to denote ‘good sense’ or practical intelligence.