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when a man takes more than his
share, it is frequently not due to any of these vices, and certainly not to all of them,
yet nevertheless the action does display some vice, since we blame it; in fact it displays
the vice of Injustice. 2.
[3]
Therefore there is another sort of Injustice, which is a part of Injustice in the
universal sense, and there is something unjust which is a part of the unjust in general,
or illegal. 2.
[4]
(2) Again, suppose two men to commit adultery, one for profit, and
gaining by the act, the other from desire, and having to pay, and so losing by it: then
the latter would be deemed to be a profligate rather than a man who takes more than his
due, while the former would be deemed unjust, but not profligate; clearly therefore it is
being done for profit that makes the action unjust. 2.
[5]
(3) Again, whereas all other unjust
acts are invariably ascribed to some particular vice—for example, adultery is
put down to Profligacy, desertion from the ranks to Cowardice, assault to
Anger—an unjust act by which a man has profited is not attributed to any vice
except Injustice.2.
[6]
Hence it is manifest that there is another sort of Injustice besides universal Injustice,
the former being a part of the latter. It is called by the same name because its
definition falls in the same genus,