This text is part of:
Search the Perseus Catalog for:
View text chunked by:
- bekker page : bekker line
- book : chapter : section
1.
[16]
This is why we approve the saying of Bias, ‘Office will
show a man’; for in office one is brought into relation with others and becomes
a member of a community.1.
[17]
The same reason, namely that it involves relationship with someone else, accounts for the
view1 that Justice alone
of the virtues is ‘the good of others,’ because it does what is for
the advantage of another, either a ruler or an associate. 1.
[18]
As then the worst man is he who practises vice
towards his friends as well as in regard to himself, so the best is not he who practises
virtue in regard to himself but he who practises it towards others; for that is a
difficult task.1.
[19]
Justice in this sense then is not a part of Virtue, but the whole of Virtue; and its
opposite Injustice is not a part of Vice but the whole of Vice 1.
[20]
(the distinction between
Virtue and Justice in this sense being clear from what has been said: they are the same
quality of mind, but their essence is different2; what as displayed in relation to others is Justice, as being simply a
disposition of a certain kind is Virtue).2.
What we are investigating, however, is the Justice which is a part of Virtue, since we
hold that there is such a thing as Justice in this sense; and similarly we are
investigating Injustice in the particular sense. 2.
[2]
The existence of the latter is proved by the
following considerations: (1) When a man displays the other
vices—for instance, throws away his shield, from Cowardice, or uses abusive
language, from Bad Temper, or refuses to assist a friend with money, from
Meanness—though he acts unjustly, he is not taking more than his share of
anything; whereas when a man takes more than his
share, it is frequently not due to any of these vices, and certainly not to all of them,
yet nevertheless the action does display some vice, since we blame it; in fact it displays
the vice of Injustice. 2.
[3]
Therefore there is another sort of Injustice, which is a part of Injustice in the
universal sense, and there is something unjust which is a part of the unjust in general,
or illegal. 2.
[4]
(2) Again, suppose two men to commit adultery, one for profit, and
gaining by the act, the other from desire, and having to pay, and so losing by it: then
the latter would be deemed to be a profligate rather than a man who takes more than his
due, while the former would be deemed unjust, but not profligate; clearly therefore it is
being done for profit that makes the action unjust. 2.
[5]
(3) Again, whereas all other unjust
acts are invariably ascribed to some particular vice—for example, adultery is
put down to Profligacy, desertion from the ranks to Cowardice, assault to
Anger—an unjust act by which a man has profited is not attributed to any vice
except Injustice.2.
[6]
Hence it is manifest that there is another sort of Injustice besides universal Injustice,
the former being a part of the latter. It is called by the same name because its
definition falls in the same genus,
1 Put into the mouth of the sophist Thrasymachus in Plato's Plat. Rep. 343c.
2 Cf. 6.8.1.