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we know from this what bad condition is as well, but we also know
what good condition is from bodies in good condition, and know what bodies are in good
condition from knowing what good condition is. Thus, supposing good condition is firmness
of flesh, bad condition must be flabbiness of flesh, and a diet productive of good
condition1 must be a
diet producing firmness of flesh.1.
[6]
Also, if one of two correlative groups of words is used in several senses, it follows as
a rule that the other is used in several senses too: for example, if
‘just’ has more than one meaning, so also has
‘unjust’ and ‘Injustice.’ 1.
[7]
Now it appears that the terms Justice
and Injustice are used in several senses, but as the equivocal uses are closely connected,
the equivocation is not detected; whereas in the case of widely different things called by
a common name, the equivocation is comparatively obvious: for example (the
difference being considerable when it is one of external form), the equivocal use
of the word kleis (key) to denote both
the bone2 at the base of the neck and
the instrument with which we lock our doors.1.
[8]
Let us then ascertain in how many senses a man is said to be
‘unjust.’ Now the term ‘unjust’ is held to apply
both to the man who breaks the law and the man who takes more than his due, the
unfair3 man. Hence it is
clear that the law-abiding man and the fair man will both be just. ‘The
just’ therefore means that which is lawful and that which is equal or fair, and
‘the unjust’ means that which is illegal and that which is unequal or
unfair.