Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
H. Rackham, Ed.

3. [16] Greatness of Soul seems therefore to be as it were a crowning ornament of the virtues: it enhances their greatness, and it cannot exist without them. Hence it is hard to be truly great souled,¹ for greatness of soul is impossible without moral nobility.3. [17]

Honor and dishonor then are the objects with which the great-souled man is especially concerned. Great honors accorded by persons of worth will afford him pleasure in a moderate degree: he will feel he is receiving only what belongs to him, or even less, for no honor can be adequate to the merits of perfect virtue, yet all the same he will deign to accept their honors, because they have no greater tribute to offer him. Honor rendered by common people and on trivial grounds he will utterly despise, for this is not what he merits. He will also despise dishonor, for no dishonor can justly attach to him. 3. [18] The great-souled man then, as has been said, is especially concerned with honor; but he will also observe due measure in respect to wealth, power, and good and bad fortune in general, as they may befall him; he will not rejoice overmuch in prosperity, nor grieve overmuch at adversity. For he does not care much even about honor, which is the greatest of external goods² （since power and wealth are desirable only for the honor they bring, at least their possessors wish to be honored for their sake）; he therefore to whom even honor is a small thing will be indifferent to other things as well.