Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
H. Rackham, Ed.

and also we think that the irrational feelings are just as much a part of human nature as the reason, so that the actions done from anger or desire also belong to the human being who does them. It is therefore strange to class these actions as involuntary.2.

Having defined voluntary and involuntary action, we next have to examine the nature of Choice.¹ For this appears to be intimately connected with virtue, and to afford a surer test of character than do our actions.2. [2]

Choice is manifestly a voluntary act. But the two terms are not synonymous, the latter being the wider. Children and the lower animals as well as men are capable of voluntary action, but not of choice. Also sudden acts may be termed voluntary, but they cannot be said to be done by choice.2. [3]

Some identify Choice with （1） Desire, or （2） Passion, or （3） Wish, or （4） some form of Opinion. These views however appear to be mistaken.

（1） The irrational animals do not exercise choice, but they do feel desire, and also passion. 2. [4] Also a man of defective self-restraint acts from desire but not from choice; and on the contrary a self-restrained man acts from choice and not from desire. 2. [5] Again, desire can run counter to choice, but not desire to desire.² And desire has regard to an object as pleasant or painful, choice has not.³ 2. [6]

（2） Still less is choice the same as passion. Acts done from passion seem very far from being done of deliberate choice. 2. [7]

（3） Again, choice is certainly not a wish, though they appear closely akin. Choice cannot have for its object impossibilities: if a man were to say he chose something impossible he would be thought a fool; but we can wish for things that are impossible, for instance immortality. 2. [8] Also we may wish for what cannot be secured by our own agency, for instance, that a particular actor⁴ or athlete may win; but no one chooses what does not rest with himself, but only what he thinks can be attained by his own act. 2. [9] Again, we wish rather for ends than for means, but choose the means to our end; for example we wish to be healthy, but choose things to make us healthy; we wish to be happy, and that is the word we use in this connection, but it would not be proper to say that we choose to be happy; since, speaking generally, choice seems to be concerned with things within our own control.2. [10]

（4） Nor yet again can it be opinion. It seems that anything may be matter of opinion—we form opinions about what is eternal,⁵ or impossible, just as much as about what is within our power. Also we distinguish opinion by its truth or falsehood, not by its being good or bad, but choice is distinguished rather as being good or bad.