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which would imply that one could have a medium amount of excess and
of deficiency, an excessive amount of excess and a deficient amount of deficiency.
[20]
But just as there can be no excess or deficiency in
temperance and justice because the mean is in a sense an extreme,1 so there can be no observance of the mean nor
excess nor deficiency in the corresponding vicious acts mentioned above, but however they
are committed, they are wrong; since, to put it in general terms, there is no such thing
as observing a mean in excess or deficiency, nor as exceeding or falling short in the
observance of a mean.7.
We must not however rest content with stating this general definition, but must show that
it applies to the particular virtues. In practical philosophy, although universal
principles have a wider application,2 those covering a particular part of the field
possess a higher degree of truth; because conduct deals with particular facts, and our
theories are bound to accord with these.
Let us then take the particular virtues from the diagram.3
[2]
The observance of the mean in fear and confidence is Courage.
1 See 6.17 above.
2 Or ‘have a wider acceptance.’
3 Here apparently the lecturer displayed a table of virtues （like the one in Aristot. Eud. Eth. 1220b 37）, exhibiting each as a mean between two vices of excess and defect in respect of a certain class of action or feeling. This is developed in detail in Bk. 3. 6-end and Bk. 4.
Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 19, translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1934.
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