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For the possession of an art, none of these conditions is included,
except the mere qualification of knowledge; but for the possession of the virtues,
knowledge is of little or no avail, whereas the other conditions, so far from being of
little moment, are all-important, inasmuch as virtue results from the repeated performance
of just and temperate actions.
[4]
Thus although actions are
entitled just and temperate when they are such acts as just and temperate men would do,
the agent is just and temperate not when he does these acts merely, but when he does them
in the way in which just and temperate men do them.
[5]
It is
correct therefore to say that a man becomes just by doing just actions and temperate by
doing temperate actions; and no one can have the remotest chance of becoming good without
doing them.
[6]
But the mass of mankind, instead of doing
virtuous acts, have recourse to discussing virtue, and fancy that they are pursuing
philosophy and that this will make them good men. In so doing they act like invalids who
listen carefully to what the doctor says, but entirely neglect to carry out his
prescriptions. That sort of philosophy will no more lead to a healthy state of soul than
will the mode of treatment produce health of body.5.
We have next to consider the formal definition of virtue.
A state of the soul is either (l) an emotion, (2) a
capacity, or (3) a disposition; virtue therefore must be one of these
three things.
[2]
By the emotions, I mean desire, anger,
fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendship, hatred, longing, jealousy, pity; and generally
those states of consciousness which are accompanied by pleasure or pain. The capacities
are the faculties in virtue of which we can be said to be liable to the emotions, for
example, capable of feeling anger or pain1 or pity.
The dispositions are the formed states of character in virtue of which we are well or ill
disposed in respect of the emotions; for instance, we have a bad disposition in regard to
anger if we are disposed to get angry too violently or not violently enough, a good
disposition if we habitually feel a moderate amount of anger; and similarly in respect of
the other emotions.
[3]
Now the virtues and vices are not emotions because we are not pronounced good or bad
according to our emotions, but we are according to our virtues and vices; nor are we
either praised or blamed for our emotions—a man is not praised for being
frightened or angry, nor is he blamed for being angry merely, but for being angry in a
certain way—
1 Probably for ‘pain’ we should read ‘fear.’