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[19]
If the other hand it be more correct to speak of the appetitive part of the soul also as
rational, in that case it is the rational part which, as well as the whole soul, is
divided into two, the one division having rational principle in the proper sense and in
itself, the other obedient to it as a child to its father.
[20]
Now virtue also is differentiated in correspondence with this division of the soul. Some
forms of virtue are called intellectual virtues, others moral virtues: Wisdom or
intelligence and Prudence1 are intellectual, Liberality and
Temperance are moral virtues. When describing a man's moral character we do not say that
he is wise or intelligent, but gentle or temperate; but a wise man also is praised for his
disposition2 , and praiseworthy dispositions we term virtues.
1 i.e., practical, as distinguished from speculative, wisdom.
2 Viz. Speculative Wisdom （as distinguished from Prudence or Practical Wisdom）, which is therefore a virtue, though not a virtue in the narrower sense of moral virtue. Throughout Aristotle's ethical works, praise and blame are the ordinary tests of virtue and vice. （See also chap. 12.）
Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 19, translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1934.
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