doing liberal things, and similarly with
the other virtues.
[13]
But if so, actions in conformity with
virtue must be essentially pleasant.
But they are also of course both good and noble, and each in the highest degree, if the
good man judges them rightly; and his judgement is as we have said.
[14]
It follows therefore that happiness is at once the best, the noblest,
and the pleasantest of things: these qualities are not separated as the inscription at
Delos makes out— “
Justice is noblest, and health is best,
But the heart's desire is the pleasantest—,
” for the best activities possess them all; and it is the best activities, or one
activity which is the best of all, in which according to our definition happiness
consists.
[15]
Nevertheless it is manifest that happiness also requires external goods in addition, as
we said; for it is impossible, or at least not easy, to play a noble part unless furnished
with the necessary equipment.1 For many noble actions
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1 It was one of the public duties of rich citizens at Athens to equip the chorus and actors of a drama at their own expense. One so doing was called χορηγός （chorus-leader, as no doubt originally he was）, and the dresses, etc., he supplied, χορηγία. The latter term is frequently used by Aristotle to denote the material equipment of life, and has almost or quite ceased to be felt as a metaphor.
Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 19, translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1934.
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