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[20]
Nor again must we in all matters alike demand an explanation of the reason why things are
what they are; in some cases it is enough if the fact that they are so is satisfactorily
established.1 This is the case with
first principles; and the fact is the primary thing—it is a first
principle.
[21]
And principles are studied—some by
induction, others by perception, others by some form of habituation, and also others
otherwise2;
[22]
so we must endeavor to arrive at the principles of each kind in their
natural manner, and must also be careful to define them correctly,
[23]
since they are of great importance for the subsequent course of the
enquiry. The beginning is admittedly more than half of the whole,3 and throws light at once on many of the
questions under investigation.8.
Accordingly we must examine our first principle4 not only as a logical
conclusion deduced from certain premises but also in the light of the current opinions on
the subject. For if a proposition be true, all the facts harmonize with it, but if it is
false, it is quickly seen to be discordant with them.
[2]
Now things good have been divided into three classes, external goods on the one hand, and
goods of the soul and of the body on the other5; and of these three kinds of goods, those of the soul we commonly
pronounce good in the fullest sense and the highest degree. But it is our actions and the
soul's active exercise of its functions6 that we posit （as being Happiness）; hence so
far as this opinion goes—and it is of long standing, and generally accepted by
students of philosophy—it supports the correctness of our definition of
Happiness.
[3]
It also shows it to be right in declaring the End to consist in certain actions or
activities, for thus the End is included among goods of the soul,
1 Cf. 4.7.
2 This is usually taken ‘that is, different ones in different ways,’ but καὶ . . . δέ seems to refer to other classes as well.
3 The usual form of the proverb is ‘The beginning is half of the whole.’ Aristotle applies it by a sort of play on words to ἀρχή in its technical sense of a general principle of science, which is a ‘beginning’ in the sense that it is the starting-point of deductive reasoning. There is a reminiscence of Hesiod, Hes. WD 30, πλέον ἥμισυ παντός, ‘The half is more than the whole,’ though the meaning of that is entirely different.
4 i.e. our definition of the Good for man, or happiness.
5 The turn of phrase associates ‘bodily goods’ with ‘goods of the soul,’ both being personal, in contrast with the third class, ‘external goods.’ But it at once appears that the important distinction is between ‘goods of the soul’ on the one hand and all rest （‘the good in the body and those outside and of fortune,’ 7.13.2） on the other. Hence in 8.3 ‘external goods’ must include ‘bodily goods’ as also 8.15 f., where ‘external goods’ are subdivided into the instruments and the indispensable conditions of well-being （and so in more scientific language, 9.7）, the latter subdivision including beauty, the only bodily good there specified.
6 See the definition, 7.15.
Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 19, translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1934.
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