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[3]
Moreover, Prudence is intimately connected with Moral Virtue, and this
with Prudence, inasmuch as the first Principles which Prudence employs are determined by
the Moral Virtues, and the right standard for the Moral Virtues is determined by Prudence.
But these being also connected with the passions
are related to our composite nature; now the virtues of our composite nature are purely
human; so therefore also is the life that manifests these virtues, and the happiness that
belongs to it. Whereas the happiness that belongs to the intellect is separate1: so much may be said about it
here, for a full discussion of the matter is beyond the scope of our present purpose.
1 In Aristot. De anima 3.5 Aristotle distinguishes the active from the passive intellect, and pronounces the former to be ‘separate or separable （from matter, or the body）, unmixed and impassible.’
Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 19, translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1934.
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