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1245a]
[1]
If, therefore, of the pair of corresponding series
1 of this kind one is always in the
class of the desirable, and the known and the perceived are generally
speaking constituted by their participation in the 'determined'
nature, so that to wish to perceive oneself is to wish oneself to be
of a certain character,—since, then, we are not each of
these things in ourselves but only by participating in these faculties
in the process of perceiving or knowing (for when perceiving one
becomes perceived by means of what one previously perceives,
2 in the
manner and in the respect in which one perceives it, and when knowing
one becomes known)—hence owing to this one wishes always to
live because one wishes always to know; and this is because one wishes
to be oneself the object known. To choose to live in the society of others might,
therefore, from a certain point of view seem foolish (first in the
case of the things common to the other animals also, for instance
eating together or drinking together, for what difference does it make
whether these things take place when we are near together or apart, if
you take away speech? but even to share in speech that is merely
casual is a thing indifferent, and also neither to impart nor to
receive information is possible for friends who are self-sufficing,
since receiving information implies a deficiency in oneself and
imparting it a deficiency in one's friend, and likeness is
friendship)— but nevertheless it surely seems that we all find it
pleasanter to share good things with our friends,
[20]
as far as these fall to each,
and the best that each can— but among these, it falls to one to share
bodily pleasure, to another artistic study, to another
philosophy—; and so it is pleasanter to be with one's friend
(whence the saying 'Distant friends a burden are'
3), so that they must not be separated when
this is taking place. Hence also love seems to resemble friendship,
for the lover is eager to share the life of the loved one, although
not in the most proper way but in a sensuous manner.
Therefore the argument in raising the question asserts the former
position,
4 but the facts
of experience are obviously on the latter lines, so that it is clear
that the raiser of the question in a way misleads us. We must therefore examine
the truth from the following consideration: 'friend' really denotes,
in the language of the proverb,
5'another Hercules'—another self; but the
characteristics are scattered, and it is difficult for all to be
realized in the case of one person; though by nature a friend is what
is most akin, yet one resembles his friend in body and another in
spirit, and one in one part of the body or spirit, another in another.
But still none the less a friend really means as it were a separate
self. To perceive and
to know a friend, therefore, is necessarily in a manner to perceive
and in a manner to know oneself. Consequently to share even vulgar
pleasures and ordinary life with a friend is naturally pleasant (for
it always involves our simultaneously perceiving the friend), but more
so to share the more divine pleasures; the reason of which is that it
is always more pleasant to behold oneself enjoying the superior good,