[1240b]
[1]
Again there are sayings about friendship such
as 'Amity is equality' and 'True friends have one spirit.' All these sayings refer back
to the single individual; for that is the way in which the individual
wishes good to himself, as nobody benefits himself for some ulterior
motive, nor speaks well of himself for such and such a consideration,
because he acted as an individual; for one who displays his affection
wishes not to be but to be thought affectionate. And wishing for the other to
exist, and associating together, and sharing joy and grief, and 'being
one spirit'1 and
being unable even to live without one another but dying
together—for this is the case with the single individual,
and he associates with himself in this way,—all these
characteristics then belong to the man in relation to himself.
In a wicked man on
the other hand, for instance in one who lacks self-control, there is
discord, and because of this it is thought to be possible for a man
actually to be his own enemy; but as being one and indivisible he is
desirable to himself.
This is the case with a good man and one whose friendship is based on
goodness, because assuredly an evil man is not a single individual but
many, and a different person in the same day, and full of caprice.
Hence a man's affection for himself carries back to love of the
good;
[20]
for because in a
way a man is like himself and a single person and good to himself, in
this way he is dear and desirable to himself. And a man is like that
by nature, but a wicked man is contrary to nature. But a good man does not
rebuke himself either at the time, like the uncontrolled, nor yet his
former self his later, like the penitent, nor his later self his
former, like the liar— (and generally, if it is necessary to distinguish as
the sophists do, he is related to himself as 'John Styles' is related
to 'good John Styles'2;
for it is clear that the same amount of 'John Styles' is good as of
'good John Styles')—because when men blame themselves they
are murdering their own personalities, whereas everybody seems to
himself good. And he who is absolutely good seeks to be dear even to
himself, as has been said,3 because he has two factors within him which by
nature desire to be friendly and which it is impossible to draw
asunder. Therefore in
the case of man each individual seems dear to himself, although in the
case of other animals it is not so, for example a horse to itself . .
.4 so it is not dear to itself. But neither
are children, but only when they have come to possess purposive
choice; for when that point is reached the mind is at variance with
the appetite. And
affection for oneself resembles the affection of relationship: neither
connection is in people's own power to dissolve, but even if the
parties quarrel, nevertheless relatives are still relatives and the
individual is still one as long as he lives. From what has been said,
then, it is clear how many meanings there are of the term 'affection,'
and that all the forms of friendship carry back to the first one.
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