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1238b]
[1]
It is also possible for a bad
man to be friends with a good man, for the bad man may be useful to
the good man for his purpose at the time-and the good man to the
uncontrolled man for his purpose at the time and to the bad man for
the purpose natural to him; and he will wish his friend what is
good—wish absolutely things absolutely good, and under a
given condition things good for him, as poverty or disease may be
beneficial: things good for him he will wish for the sake of the
absolute goods, in the way in which he wishes his friend to drink
medicine—he does not wish the action in itself but wishes it
for the given purpose.
Moreover a bad man may also be friends with a good one in the ways in
which men not good may be friends with one another: he may be pleasant
to him not as being bad but as sharing some common characteristic, for
instance if he is musical. Again they may be friends in the way in
which there is some good in everybody (owing to which some men are
sociable
1 even though good), or in the way in
which they suit each particular person, for all men have something of
good.
These then are three kinds of friendship;
and in all of these the term friendship in a manner indicates
equality, for even with those who are friends on the ground of
goodness the friendship is in a manner based on equality of
goodness.
But another variety of these kinds is
friendship on a basis of superiority, as in that of a god for a
man,
[20]
for that is a
different kind of friendship, and generally of a ruler and subject;
just as the principle of justice between them is also different, being
one of equality proportionally but not of equality numerically.
2 The friendship of father for son is in this class,
and that of benefactor for beneficiary. And of these sorts of friendship themselves
there are varieties: the friendship of father for son is different
from that of husband for wife—the former is friendship as
between ruler and subject, the latter that of benefactor for
beneficiary. And in these varieties either there is no return of
affection or it is not returned in a similar way. For it would be ludicrous if
one were to accuse God because he does not return love in the same way
as he is loved, or for a subject to make this accusation against a
ruler; for it is the part of a ruler to be loved, not to love, or else
to love in another way.
And the pleasure differs; the pleasure that a man of established
position has in his own property or son and that which one who lacks
them feels in an estate or a child coming to him are not one and the
same. And in the same way
also in the case of those who are friends for utility or for
pleasure—some are on a footing of equality, others one of
superiority. Owing to this those who think they are on the former
footing complain if they are not useful and beneficial in a similar
manner; and also in the case of pleasure.
3 This is clear in cases of passionate affection, for
this is often a cause of combat between the lover and his beloved: the
lover does not see that they have not the same reason for their
affection. Hence Aenicus
4 has said: "A loved one so
would speak, but not a lover." But they think that the reason is the
same.