[1224b]
[1]
whereas desire leads
a man on without employing persuasion, since it possesses no element
of rational principle. It
has, then, been stated that these men only seem to act under force and
involuntarily; and we have shown the reason—it is because
their action has a certain resemblance to forced action, just as we
speak of forced action even in the case of inanimate objects too.
Yet nevertheless
if one added there also the addition made in our definition, the
statement is refuted. For we speak of a thing as being forced to act
when something external moves it or brings it to rest, acting against
the impulse within the thing itself—when there is no
external motive, we do not say that it acts under force; and in the
uncontrolled man and the self-controlled it is the impulse present in
the man himself that drives him (for he has both impulses), so that as
far as these considerations go neither of them would be acting under
force, but voluntarily;
nor yet are they acting of necessity, for by necessity we mean an
external principle that either checks or moves a man in opposition to
his impulse—as if A were to take hold of B's hand and with
it strike C, B's will and desire both resisting; whereas when the
source of action is from within, we do not speak of the act as done
under force. Again, both
pleasure and pain are present in both cases; for a man exercising
self-control both feels pain when he finally acts in opposition to his
desire and enjoys the pleasure of hoping that he will be benefited
later on, or is even being benefited already, by being in good
health;
[20]
and the
uncontrolled man enjoys getting what he desires owing to his lack of
self-control, but feels prospective pain because he thinks he is doing
a bad thing. Hence it is
reasonable to say that each does what he does under compulsion, and
that each is at one point acting involuntarily, from motives both of
appetition and of rational calculation—for calculation and
appetition are things quite separate, and each is pushed aside by the
other. Hence men transfer this to the spirit as a whole, because they
see something of this sort in the experiences of the spirit.
Now it is
admissible to say this in the case of the parts, but the spirit as a
whole both in the uncontrolled and in the self-controlled man acts
voluntarily, and in neither case does the man act under compulsion,
but one of the parts in them so acts—for we possess by
nature both parts; since rational principle is a natural property,
because it will be present in us if our growth is allowed and not
stunted, and also desire is natural, because it accompanies and is
present in us from birth; and these are pretty nearly the two things by which we define the
natural—it is what accompanies everybody as soon as he is
born, or else what comes to us if development is allowed to go on
regularly, for example grey hair, old age, etc. Therefore each of the
two persons in a way acts not in accordance with nature, but
absolutely each does act according to nature, though not according to
the same nature. The
difficulties, then, raised about the uncontrolled and the
self-controlled man are these: do both, or does one of them, act under
compulsion, so that they either act not voluntarily or else
voluntarily and under compulsion at the same time—and if
what is done under compulsion is involuntary, act voluntarily and
involuntarily at the same time? And it is fairly clear from what has
been said how these difficulties are to be met.
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