Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics

[1223b] [1] so that the uncontrolled man will act unrighteously by acting in conformity with desire. But unrighteous action is voluntary.¹ Therefore he will be acting voluntarily, and action guided by desire is voluntary. Indeed it would be strange if those who become uncontrolled will be more righteous.²— From these considerations, then, it would appear that what is in conformity with desire is voluntary; and from this the opposite³ follows, for all that a man does voluntarily he wishes to do, and what he wishes to do he does voluntarily, but nobody wishes what he thinks to be bad. But yet the uncontrolled man does not do what he wishes, for being uncontrolled means acting against what one thinks to be best owing to desire; hence it will come about that the same person is acting voluntarily and involuntarily at the same time. But this is impossible. And further, the self-controlled man will act righteously, or more righteously than lack of control will; for self-control is goodness, and goodness makes men more righteous. And a man exercises self-control when he acts against his desire in conformity with rational calculation. So that if righteous action is voluntary, as also unrighteous action (for both of these seem to be voluntary, and if one of them is voluntary it follows of necessity that the other is also), whereas what is contrary to desire is involuntary, it therefore follows that the same person will do the same action voluntarily and involuntarily at the same time.

The same argument applies also in the case of passion; [20] for there appear to be control and lack of control of passion as well as of desire and what is contrary to passion is painful and restraint is a matter of force, so that if what is forced is involuntary, what is in accordance with passion will always be voluntary. Even Heracleitus⁴ seems to have in view the strength of passion when he remarks that the checking of passion is painful; for 'It is difficult (he says) to do battle with passion, for it buys its wish at the price of life.' And if it is impossible to do the same act voluntarily and involuntarily at the same time and in respect of the same part of the act, action guided by one's wish is more voluntary than action guided by desire or passion. And a proof of this is that we do many things voluntarily without anger or desire.

It remains, therefore, to consider whether acting as we wish and acting voluntarily are the same. This also seems impossible. For it is a fundamental assumption with us, and a general opinion, that wickedness makes men more unrighteous; and lack of self-control seems to be a sort of wickedness. But from the hypothesis that acting as we wish and acting voluntarily are the same the opposite will result; for nobody wishes things that he thinks to be bad, yet he does them when he has become uncontrolled, so if to do injustice is voluntary and the voluntary is what is in accordance with one's wish, then when a man has become uncontrolled he will no longer be acting unjustly but will be more just than he was before he lost control of himself. But this is impossible. Therefore it is clear that acting voluntarily does not mean acting in accordance with appetition nor acting involuntarily acting in opposition to appetition.

Also it is clear from the following considerations that voluntary action does not mean acting in accordance with purposive choice. It was proved⁵ that acting in accordance with one's wish is not acting involuntarily,