[
1222b]
[1]
yet there is also excess in the direction of
being gentle and placable and not being angry when struck, but men of
that sort are few, and everyone is more prone to the other extreme; on
which account moreover a passionate temper is not a characteristic of
a toady.
1And since we have dealt with
the scheme of states of character in respect of the various emotions
in which there are excesses and deficiencies, and of the opposite
states in accordance with which men are disposed in accordance with
right principle (though the question what is the right principle and
what rule is to guide us in defining the mean must be considered
later
2), it is evident that all the forms of moral goodness and
badness have to do with excesses and deficiencies of pleasures and
pains, and that pleasures and pains result from the states of
character and modes of emotion mentioned. But then the best state in relation to each
class of thing is the middle state. It is clear, therefore, that the
virtues will be either all or some of these middle states.
Let us, therefore, take another starting-point for the ensuing
inquiry.
3 Now
all essences are by nature first principles of a certain kind, owing
to which each is able to generate many things of the same sort as
itself, for example a man engenders men, and in general an animal
animals, and a plant plants. And in addition to this, obviously man alone among
animals initiates certain conduct—
[20]
for we should not ascribe conduct to any of
the others. And the first
principles of that sort, which are the first source of motions, are
called first principles in the strict sense, and most rightly those
that have necessary results; doubtless God is a ruling principle that
acts in this way. But the
strict sense of 'first principle' is not found in first principles
incapable of movement, for example those of mathematics, although the
term is indeed used of them by analogy, for in mathematics if the
first principle were changed virtually all the things proved from it
would change, though they do not change owing to themselves, one being
destroyed by the other, except by destroying the assumption and
thereby establishing a proof.
4 But man is a first principle of a certain
motion, for action is motion. And since as in other matters the first
principle is a cause of the things that exist or come into existence
because of it, we must think as we do in the case of demonstrations.
For example, if as
the angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles the
angles of a quadrilateral are necessarily equal to four right angles,
that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles is clearly
the cause of that fact; and supposing a triangle were to change, a
quadrilateral would necessarily change too—for example if
the angles of a triangle became equal to three right angles, the
angles of a quadrilateral would become equal to six right angles, or
if four, eight; also if a triangle does not change but is as
described, a quadrilateral too must of necessity be as
described.
The necessity of what we are arguing is
clear from
Analytics5; at present we cannot either deny or affirm anything
definitely except just this. Supposing there were no further cause of
the triangle's having the property stated, then the triangle would be
a sort of first principle or cause of the later stages. Hence if in fact there are
among existing things some that admit of the opposite state, their
first principles also must necessarily have the same quality;