[
1217a]
[1]
For because to say nothing at
random but use reasoned argument seems to mark a philosopher, some
people often without being detected advance arguments that are not
germane to the subject under treatment and that have nothing in them
(and they do this
sometimes through ignorance and sometimes from charlatanry), which
bring it about that even men of experience and practical capacity are
taken in by these people, who neither possess nor are capable of
constructive or practical thought.
1
And this befalls them owing to lack of education—for in
respect of each subject inability to distinguish arguments germane to
the subject from those foreign to it is lack of education. And it is also well to judge
separately the statement of the cause and the demonstrated fact, both
for the reason stated just now,
2 that it is not proper in regard to all things to
attend to theoretical arguments, but often rather to the facts of
observation (whereas now when men are unable to refute an argument
they are forced to believe what has been said), and also because
often, although the result that seems to have been proved by the
arguments is true, it is not true because of the cause asserted in the
argument. For it is possible to prove truth by falsehood, as is clear
from
Analytics.
3These prefatory
remarks having also been made, let us proceed by starting first from
the firststatements, which, as has been said,
4 are not clearly expressed,
[20]
afterwards seeking to discover clearly the essential
nature of happiness. Now
it is agreed that happiness is the greatest and best of human goods
(and we say 'human' because there might very likely also be a
happiness belonging to some higher being, for instance a god);
since none of the
other animals, which are inferior in nature to men, share in the
designation 'happy,' for a horse is not happy, nor is a bird nor a
fish nor any other existing thing whose designation does not indicate
that it possesses in its nature a share of something divine, but it is
by some other mode of participating in things good that one of them
has a better life and another a worse.
But the fact that
this is so must be considered later.
5 At the present
let us say that among things good some are within the range of action
for a human being and others are not. And we make this distinction for
the reason that some existing things do not participate in change at
all, and therefore some good things do not, and these are perhaps in
their nature the best things; and some things, though practicable, are
only practicable for beings superior to us. And inasmuch as 'practicable'
has two meanings (for both the Ends for which we act and the actions
that we do as means to those Ends have to do with action—for
example we class among things practicable both health and wealth and
the pursuits that are followed for the sake of health and wealth,
healthy exercise and lucrative business), it is clear that happiness
must be set down as the best of the things practicable for a human
being.