Plato, Laws

[900a] very likely you are disturbed, when amongst the number of these you discover—whether from hearsay or from your own personal observation—some who have been guilty of many dreadful impieties, and who, just because of these, have risen from a small position to royalty and the highest rank; then the consequence of all this clearly is that, since on the one hand you are unwilling to hold the gods responsible for such things because of your kinship to them, and since on the other hand you are driven by lack of logic and inability [900b] to repudiate the gods, you have come to your present morbid state of mind, in which you opine that the gods exist, but scorn and neglect human affairs. In order, therefore, that your present opinion may not grow to a greater height of morbid impiety, but that we may succeed in repelling the onset of its pollution (if haply we are able) by argument, let us endeavor to attach our next argument to that which we set forth in full to him who utterly disbelieves gods, and thereby to employ the latter as well.” [900c] And do you, Clinias and Megillus, take the part of the young man in answering, as you did before; and should anything untoward occur in the course of the argument, I will make answer for you, as I did just now, and convey you across the stream.¹

Clinias
A good suggestion! We will do our best to carry it out; and do you do likewise.

Athenian
Well, there will probably be no difficulty in proving to this man that the gods care for small things no less than for things superlatively great. For, of course, [900d] he was present at our recent argument, and heard that the gods, being good with all goodness, possess such care of the whole as is most proper to themselves.

Clinias
Most certainly he heard that.

Athenian
Let us join next in enquiring what is that goodness of theirs in respect of which we agree that they are good. Come now, do we say that prudence and the possession of reason are parts of goodness, and the opposites of these of badness?

Clinias
We do say so.

Athenian
And further, that courage is part of goodness, and cowardice of badness?

Clinias
Certainly. [900e]

Athenian
And shall we say that some of these are foul, others fair?

Clinias
Necessarily.

Athenian
And shall we say that all such as are mean belong to us, if to anyone, whereas the gods have no share in any such things, great or small?

Clinias
To this, too, everyone would assent.

Athenian
Well then, shall we reckon neglect, idleness and indolence as goodness of soul? Or how say you?

Clinias
How could we?

Athenian
As the opposite, then?

Clinias
Yes.