Plato, Republic

[585a] they truly think themselves to be, and really are, in a state of pain, but, when they move from pain to the middle and neutral state, they intensely believe that they are approaching fulfillment and pleasure, and just as if, in ignorance of white, they were comparing grey with black,¹ so, being inexperienced in true pleasure, they are deceived by viewing painlessness in its relation to pain?” “No, by Zeus,” he said, “it would not surprise me, but far rather if it were not so.” “In this way, then, consider it.² Are not hunger and thirst and similar states inanitions or emptinesses³ [585b] of the bodily habit?” “Surely.” “And is not ignorance and folly in turn a kind of emptiness of the habit of the soul?” “It is indeed.” “And he who partakes of nourishment⁴ and he who gets, wisdom fills the void and is filled?” “Of course.” “And which is the truer filling and fulfillment, that of the less or of the more real being?” “Evidently that of the more real.” “And which of the two groups or kinds do you think has a greater part in pure essence, the class of foods, drinks, and relishes and nourishment generally, or the kind of true opinion,⁵ [585c] knowledge and reason,⁶ and, in sum, all the things that are more excellent⁷? Form your judgement thus. Which do you think more truly is, that which clings to what is ever like itself and immortal and to the truth, and that which is itself of such a nature and is born in a thing of that nature, or that which clings to what is mortal and never the same and is itself such and is born in such a thing?” “That which cleaves to what is ever the same far surpasses,” he said. “Does the essence of that which never abides the same partake of real essence any more than of knowledge?” “By no means.” “Or of truth and reality?” “Not of that, either.” “And if a thing has less of truth has it not also less of real essence or existence?” “Necessarily.” “And is it not generally true [585d] that the kinds concerned with the service of the body partake less of truth and reality than those that serve the soul?” “Much less.” “And do you not think that the same holds of the body itself in comparison with the soul?” “I do.” “Then is not that which is fulfilled of what more truly is, and which itself more truly is, more truly filled and satisfied than that which being itself less real is filled with more unreal things?” “Of course.” “If, then, to be filled with what befits nature is pleasure, then that which is more really filled with real things [585e] would more really and truly cause us to enjoy a true pleasure, while that which partakes of the less truly existent would be less truly and surely filled and would partake of a less trustworthy and less true pleasure.” “Most inevitably,” he said. “Then those who have no experience