[524d]
“Just so,” he said.“This, then, is just what I was trying to explain a
little while ago when I said that some things are provocative of thought and
some are not, defining as provocative things that impinge upon the senses
together with their opposites, while those that do not I said do not tend to
awaken reflection.” “Well, now I understand,” he
said, “and agree.” “To which class, then, do you
think number and the one belong1?” “I cannot conceive,” he said.
“Well, reason it out from what has already been said. For, if unity is
adequately2 seen by itself
1 To waive metaphysics, unity is, as modern mathematicians say, a concept of the mind which experience breaks up. The thought is familiar to Plato from the Meno to the Parmenides. But it is not true that Plato derived the very notion of the concept from the problem of the one and the many. Unity is a typical concept, but the consciousness of the concept was developed by the Socratic quest for the definition.
2 Cf. 523 B. The meaning must be gathered from the context.
Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1969.
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