[477a]
that
which is not be known?” “We are sufficiently assured of
this, then, even if we should examine it from every point of view, that that
which entirely1‘is’ is entirely knowable,
and that which in no way 'is' is in every way unknowable.”
“Most sufficiently.” “Good. If a thing, then,
is so conditioned as both to be and not to be, would it not lie between that
which absolutely and unqualifiedly is and that which in no way
is?” “Between.” “Then if knowledge
pertains to that which is and ignorance of necessity to that which is not,
1 παντελῶς: cf.μηδαμῇ and 478 Dπάντως. Not foreseeing modern philology Plato did not think it necessary to repeat these qualifying adverbs in 478 Bἢ ἀδύνατον καὶ δοξάσαι τὸ μὴ ὄν, which is still sometimes quoted to prove that Plato was “yet” naively unaware of the distinction between is-not-at-all (does not exist) and is-not-this-or-that.
Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1969.
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