[442d]
by reason of the friendship and concord of these same
parts, when, namely, the ruling principle and its two subjects are at one in
the belief that the reason ought to rule, and do not raise faction against
it?” “The virtue of soberness certainly,” said
he, “is nothing else than this, whether in a city or an
individual.” “But surely, now, a man is just by that
which and in the way we have so often1 described.” “That is
altogether necessary.” “Well then,” said I,
“has our idea of justice in any way lost the edge2 of its
contour so as to look like anything else than precisely what it showed
itself to be in the state?” “I think not,” he
said.
Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1969.
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