[440c]
“No, by heaven,” he said.
“Again, when a man thinks himself to be in the wrong,1 is it not true that the nobler he is the less is he
capable of anger though suffering hunger and cold2 and
whatsoever else at the hands of him whom he believes to be acting justly
therein, and as I say3 his spirit refuses to be aroused against such
a one?” “True,” he said. “But what
when a man believes himself to be wronged, does not his spirit in that
case4 seethe and grow fierce (and also because of his
suffering hunger,
1 So Aristotle Rhet. 1380 b 17οὐ γίγνεται γὰρ ἡ ὀργὴ πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον, and Eth. Nic. 1135 b 28ἐπὶ φαινομένῃ γὰρ ἀδικίᾳ ἡ ὀργή ἐστιν. This is true only with Plato's reservation γενναιότερος. The baser type is angry when in the wrong.
2 Cf. Demosthenes xv. 10 for the same general idea.
3 ὃ λέγω: idiomatic, “as I was saying.”
4 ἐν τούτῳ: possibly “in such an one,” preferably “in such a case.”θυμός is plainly the subject of ζεῖ. (Cf. the physiological definition in Aristotle De anima 403 a 31ζέσιν τοῦ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν αἵματος), and so, strictly speaking, of all the other verbs down to λήγει. καὶ διὰ τὸ πεινῆν . . . πάσχειν is best taken as a parenthesis giving an additional reason for the anger, besides the sense of injustice.
Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1969.
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