Plato, Republic

[425a] it is impossible that they should grow up to be men of serious temper and lawful spirit.” “Of course,” he said. “And so we may reason that when children in their earliest play are imbued with the spirit of law and order through their music, the opposite of the former supposition happens—this spirit waits upon them in all things and fosters their growth, and restores and sets up again whatever was overthrown in the other¹ type of state.” “True, indeed,” he said. “Then such men rediscover for themselves those seemingly trifling conventions which their predecessors abolished altogether.” “Of what sort?” “Such things as [425b] the becoming silence² of the young in the presence of their elders; the giving place to them and rising up before them, and dutiful service of parents, and the cut of the hair³ and the garments and the fashion of the foot-gear, and in general the deportment of the body and everything of the kind. Don't you think so?” “I do.” “Yet to enact them into laws would, I think, be silly.⁴ For such laws are not obeyed nor would they last, being enacted only in words and on paper.” “How could they?” “At any rate, Adeimantus,” I said, “the direction of the education from whence one starts is likely to determine [425c] the quality of what follows. Does not like ever summon like?” “Surely.” “And the final⁵ outcome, I presume, we would say is one complete and vigorous product of good or the reverse.” “Of course,” said he. “For my part, then,” I said, “for these reasons I would not go on to try to legislate on such matters.⁶” “With good reason,” said he. “But what, in heaven's name,” said I, “about business matters, the deals⁷ that men make with one another in the agora— [425d] and, if you please, contracts with workmen⁸ and actions for foul language⁹ and assault, the filing of declarations,¹⁰ the impanelling of juries, the payment and exaction of any dues that may be needful in markets or harbors and in general market, police or harbor regulations and the like, can we bring¹¹ ourselves to legislate about these?” “Nay, ‘twould not be fitting,” he said, “to dictate to good and honorable men.¹² For most of the enactments that are needed about these things [425e] they will easily, I presume, discover.” “Yes, my friend, provided God grants them the preservation of the principles of law that we have already discussed.” “Failing that,” said he, “they will pass their lives multiplying such petty laws and amending them in the expectation of attaining what is best.” “You mean,” said I, “that the life of such citizens will resemble that of men who are sick, yet from intemperance are unwilling to abandon¹³ their unwholesome regimen.”