[350d]
not as I now lightly
narrate them, but with much baulking and reluctance1 and prodigious
sweating, it being summer, and it was then I beheld what I had never seen
before—Thrasymachus blushing.2 But
when we did reach our conclusion that justice is virtue and wisdom and
injustice vice and ignorance, “Good,” said I,
“let this be taken as established.3 But we were also affirming that
injustice is a strong and potent thing. Don't you remember,
Thrasymachus?” “I remember,” he said;
“but I don't agree with what you are now saying either and I have
an answer to it,
1 Cf. Protagoras 333 B
2 Cf. the blush of the sophist in Euthydemus 297 A
3 The main paradox of Thrasymachus is refuted. It will be easy to transfer the other laudatory epithets ἰσχυρόν, etc., from injustice back to justice. Thrasymachus at first refuses to share in the discussion but finally nods an ironical assent to everything that Socrates says. So Callicles in Gorgias 510 A.
Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1969.
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