[387d]
wailings and lamentations of men of
repute?” “That necessarily follows,” he said,
“from the other.” “Consider,” said
I, “whether we shall be right in thus getting rid of them or not.
What we affirm is that a good man1 will not think that for
a good man, whose friend he also is, death is a terrible thing.”
“Yes, we say that.” “Then it would not be for
his friend's2
sake as if he had suffered something dreadful that he would make
lament.” “Certainly not.” “But we
also say this, that such a one is most of all men sufficient unto
himself3
1 That only the good can be truly friends was a favorite doctrine of the ancient moralists. Cf. Lysis 214 C, Xenophon Memorabilia ii. 6. 9, 20.
2 Cf. Phaedo 117 C “I wept for myself, for surely not for him.”
3 αὐτάρκης is the equivalent of ἱκανὸς αὑτῷ in Lysis 215 A. For the idea Cf. Menexenus 247 E. Self-sufficiency is the mark of a good man, of God, of the universe (Timaeus 33 D), of happiness in Aristotle, and of the Stoic sage.
Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1969.
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