[379b]
and always to be spoken of1 as
such?” “Certainly.” “But further, no
good thing is harmful, is it?” “I think not.”
“Can what is not harmful harm?” “By no
means.” “Can that which does not harm do any
evil?” “Not that either.” “But that
which does no evil would not be cause of any evil either?”
“How could it?” “Once more, is the good
beneficent?” “Yes.” “It is the
cause, then, of welfare?” “Yes.”
“Then the good is not the cause of all things, but of things that
are well it the cause—of things that are ill it is
blameless.” “Entirely so,”
1 It is charcteristic of Plato to distinguish the fact and the desirability of proclaiming it. The argument proceeds by the minute links which tempt to parody. Below τὸ ἀγαθόν, followed by οὐδ᾽ ἄρα . . . ὁ θεός, is in itself a refutation of the ontological identification in Plato of God and the Idea of Good. But the essential goodness of God is a commonplace of liberal and philosophical theology, from the Stoics to Whittier's hymn, “The Eternal Goodness.”
Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1969.
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