[352d]
are completely incapable of effective
action—all this I understand to be the truth, and not what you
originally laid down. But whether it is also true1 that the just have a better life
than the unjust and are happier, which is the question we afterwards
proposed for examination, is what we now have to consider. It appears even
now that they are, I think, from what has already been said. But all the
same we must examine it more carefully.2 For it is no
ordinary3 matter that we are discussing, but the right conduct of
life.” “Proceed with your inquiry,” he said.
“I proceed,” said I. “Tell me
then—would you say
1 The main ethical question of the Republic, suggested in 347 E, now recurs.
2 Similarly 578 C. What has been said implies that injustice is the corruption and disease of the soul (see on 445 A-B). But Socrates wishes to make further use of the argument from ἔργον or specific function.
3 Cf. on 344 D, , pp. 71 f.
Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1969.
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