[352a]
it first renders the thing incapable of
cooperation with itself owing to faction and difference, and secondly an
enemy to itself1 and to
its opposite in every case, the just? Isn't that so?”
“By all means.” “Then in the individual too, I
presume, its presence will operate all these effects which it is its nature
to produce. It will in the first place make him incapable of accomplishing
anything because of inner faction and lack of self-agreement, and then an
enemy to himself and to the just. Is it not so?”
“Yes.” “But, my friend,
1 Plato paradoxically treats the state as one organism and the individual as many warring members (cf. Introduction p. xxxv). Hence, justice in one, and being a friend to oneself are more than metaphors for him. Cf. 621 C, 416 C, 428 D, Laws 626 E, 693 B, Epistles vii. 332 D, Antiphon 556.45 Diels ὁμονοεῖ πρὸς ἑαυτόν. Aritotle, Eth. Nic. v. 11, inquires whether a man can wrong himself, and Chrysippus (Plutarch, Stoic. Repug. xvi.) pronounces the expression absurd.
Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1969.
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