[
337a]
from clever fellows like you than
severity.”
And he on hearing
this gave a great guffaw and laughed sardonically and said, “Ye
gods! here we have the well-known irony
1 of Socrates, and I knew it and
predicted that when it came to replying you would refuse and dissemble and
do anything rather than answer any question that anyone asked
you.” “That's because you are wise, Thrasymachus, and so
you knew very well that if you asked a man how many are twelve,
[
337b]
and in putting the question warned him: don't
you be telling me, fellow, that twelve is twice six or three times four or
six times two or four times three, for I won't accept any such drivel as
that from you as an answer—it was obvious I fancy to you that no
one could give an answer to a question framed in that fashion. Suppose he
had said to you, 'Thrasymachus, what do you mean? Am I not to give any of
the prohibited answers, not even, do you mean to say, if the thing really is
one of these, but must I say something different from the truth,
[
337c]
or what do you mean?' What would have been your
answer to him?” “Humph!” said he,
“how very like the two cases are!” “There is
nothing to prevent,” said I; “yet even granted that they
are not alike, yet if it appears to the person asked the question that they
are alike, do you suppose that he will any the less answer what appears to
him, whether we forbid him or whether we don't?” “Is
that, then,” said he, “what you are going to do? Are you
going to give one of the forbidden answers?” “I
shouldn't be surprised,” I said, “if on reflection that
would be my view.” “What then,”
[
337d]
he said, “if I show you another
answer about justice differing from all these, a better one—what
penalty do you think you deserve?” “Why, what
else,” said I, “than that which it befits anyone who is
ignorant to suffer? It befits him, I presume, to learn from the one who does
know. That then is what I propose that I should suffer.”
“I like your simplicity,”
2 said he;
“but in addition to 'learning' you must pay a fine of
money.” “Well, I will when I have got it,” I
said. “It is there,” said Glaucon: “if money
is all that stands in the way, Thrasymachus, go on with your speech. We will
all contribute for Socrates.” “Oh yes, of
course,”
[
337e]
said he,
“so that Socrates may contrive, as he always does, to evade
answering himself but may cross-examine the other man and refute his
replies.” “Why, how,” I said, “my
dear fellow, could anybody answer if in the first place he did not know and
did not even profess to know, and secondly even if he had some notion of the
matter, he had been told by a man of weight that he mustn't give any of his
suppositions as an answer?