[335a]
but is not really so seems but is not really the friend.
And there will be the same assumption about the enemy.”
“Then on this view it appears the friend will be the good man and
the bad the enemy.” “Yes.” “So you
would have us qualify our former notion of the just man by an addition. We
then said it was just to do good to a friend and evil to an enemy, but now
we are to add that it is just to benefit the friend if he is good and harm
the enemy if he is bad?”
[335b]
“By all means,” he said, “that, I think,
would be the right way to put it.”“Is it then,” said I, “the part of a good
man to harm anybody whatsoever?”1“Certainly it is,” he
replied; “a man ought to harm those who are both bad and his
enemies.” “When horses2 are harmed
does it make them better or worse?” “Worse.”
“In respect of the excellence or virtue of dogs or that of
horses?” “Of horses.” “And do not
also dogs when harmed become worse in respect of canine and not of equine
virtue?” “Necessarily.”
[335c]
“And men, my dear fellow, must we not say that
when they are harmed it is in respect of the distinctive excellence or
virtue of man that they become worse?”
“Assuredly.” “And is not justice the specific
virtue of man?”3“That too must be granted.”
“Then it must also be admitted, my friend, that men who are harmed
become more unjust.” “It seems so.”
“Do musicians then make men unmusical by the art of
music?” “Impossible.” “Well, do
horsemen by horsemanship unfit men for dealing with horses?”
“No.” “By justice then do the just make men
unjust,
[335d]
or in sum do the good by virtue
make men bad?” “Nay, it is impossible.”
“It is not, I take it, the function4 of heat
to chill but of its opposite.” “Yes.”
“Nor of dryness to moisten but of its opposite.”
“Assuredly.” “Nor yet of the good to harm but
of its opposite.” “So it appears.”
“But the just man is good?”
“Certainly.” “It is not then the function of
the just man, Polemarchus, to harm either friend or anyone else, but of his
opposite.” “I think you are altogether right,
[335e]
Socrates.” “If, then,
anyone affirms that it is just to render to each his due and he means by
this, that injury and harm is what is due to his enemies from the just
man5 and benefits to his friends, he
was no truly wise man who said it. For what he meant was not true. For it
has been made clear to us that in no case is it just to harm
anyone.” “I concede it,” he said.
“We will take up arms against him, then,” said I,
“you and I together, if anyone affirms that either Simonides or
Bias6 or Pittacus or any other of
the wise and blessed said such a thing.” “I, for my
part,” he said, “am ready to join in the battle with
you.”
1 After the word-fence the ethical idea is reached which Plato was the first to affirm.
2 For Socratic comparison of animals and men Cf. Apology 30 C, Euthyphro 13 B-C, and on 451 C.
3 The desired conclusion and all the idealistic paradoxes of Socrates, and later of Stoicism, follow at once from the assumption that justice, being the specific virtue of man, is human excellence generally, so that nothing is of import except justice, and no real wrong (or harm) can be done to a man except by making him less just (or wise, or good). Cf Apology 41 D, Crito 44 D. The ambiguity of ἀρετή is similarly used 353 and 609 B-D.
4 The special “work” (Xenophon Memorabilia iv. 2. 12, iv. 6. 14) is generalized as the idea of specific function, which after Plato and Aristotle retains a prominent place in the moralizing of the Stoics and in all philosophizing. See 351 D, 352 E, Aristotle Eth. Nic. i. 7. 10, Idea of Good p. 210, Diogenes Laertius vii. 103, Porphyr.De abstin. ii. 41, Courtney, Studies in Philosophy p. 125, Spencer, Data of Ethics 12.
5 Xenophon approves the doctrine (Memorabilia ii. 6. 35, ii. 3. 14) and attributes it to Simonides (Hiero 2. 2). But Plato is not thinking specially of him. See on 332 p.
6 For the legend and the varying lists of the Seven Wise Men see Zeller i. 158, n. 2. No sage or saint could have taught unedifying doctrine. His meaning must have been right. Cf. 331 E, 332 B, Protagoras 345 D, Simplic. on Aristotle Physics 107. 30.
Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1969.
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