[334d]
and injure the good?”
“It would seem so.” “But again the good are
just and incapable of injustice.” “True.”
“On your reasoning then it is just to wrong those who do no
injustice.” “Nay, nay, Socrates,” he said,
“the reasoning can't be right.”1“Then,” said I,
“it is just to harm the unjust and benefit the just.”
“That seems a better conclusion than the other.”
“It will work out, then, for many, Polemarchus, who have misjudged
men that it is just to harm their friends,
1 Or, “that is an immoral conclusion.”
Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1969.
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