[160b]
in which we saw that they cannot participate, if they are in every way utterly deprived of unity.” “Very true.” “Therefore if one exists, the one is all things and nothing at all in relation both to itself and to all others.” “Perfectly true.”“Well, and ought we not next to consider what must happen if one does not exist?” “Yes, we ought.” “What, then, is the sense of this hypothesis—if one does not exist?” “Is it different in any way from this—if not one does not exist?” “Certainly it is different.” “Is it merely different,
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