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[263a]

Theaetetus
I will, to the best of my ability.

Stranger
“Theaetetus sits.” It isn't a long sentence, is it?

Theaetetus
No, it is fairly short.

Stranger
Now it is for you to say what it is about and what its subject is.

Theaetetus
Clearly it is about me, and I am its subject.

Stranger
And how about this sentence?

Theaetetus
What one?

Stranger
“Theaetetus, with whom I am now talking, flies.”

Theaetetus
Every one would agree that this also is about me and I am its subject.

Stranger
But we agree that every sentence must have some quality. [263b]

Theaetetus
Yes.

Stranger
Now what quality shall be ascribed to each of these sentences?

Theaetetus
One is false, I suppose, the other true.

Stranger
The true one states facts as they are about you.

Theaetetus
Certainly.

Stranger
And the false one states things that are other than the facts.

Theaetetus
Yes.

Stranger
In other words, it speaks of things that are not as if they were.

Theaetetus
Yes, that is pretty much what it does.

Stranger
And states with reference to you that things are which are other than things which actually are; for we said, you know, that in respect to everything there are many things that are and many that are not.

Theaetetus
To be sure. [263c]

Stranger
Now the second of my sentences about you is in the first place by sheer necessity one of the shortest which conform to our definition of sentence.

Theaetetus
At any rate we just now agreed on that point.

Stranger
And secondly it has a subject.

Theaetetus
Yes.

Stranger
And if you are not the subject, there is none.

Theaetetus
Certainly not.

Stranger
And if there is no subject, it would not be a sentence at all; for we showed that a sentence without a subject is impossible.

Theaetetus
Quite right. [263d]

Stranger
Now when things are said about you, but things other are said as the same and things that are not as things that are, it appears that when such a combination is formed of verbs and nouns we have really and truly false discourse.

Theaetetus
Yes, very truly.

Stranger
Is it, then, not already plain that the three classes, thought, opinion, and fancy, all arise in our minds as both false and true?

Theaetetus
How is it plain?

Stranger
You will understand more easily if you first grap their natures [263e] and the several differences between them.

Theaetetus
Give me an opportunity.

Stranger
Well, then, thought and speech are the same; only the former, which is a silent inner conversation of the soul with itself, has been given the special name of thought. Is not that true?

Theaetetus
Certainly.

Stranger
But the stream that flows from the soul in vocal utterance through the mouth has the name of speech?

Theaetetus
True.

Stranger
And in speech we know there is just—

Theaetetus
What?

Stranger
Affirmation and negation

Theaetetus
Yes, we know that.


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