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[244a]

Stranger
But, friends, we will say, even in that way you would very clearly be saying that the two are one.

Theaetetus
You are perfectly right.

Stranger
Then since we are in perplexity, do you tell us plainly what you wish to designate when you say “being.” For it is clear that you have known this all along, whereas we formerly thought we knew, but are now perplexed. So first give us this information, that we may not think we understand what you say, when the exact opposite is the case.— [244b] If we speak in this way and make this request of them and of all who say that the universe is more than one, shall we, my boy, be doing anything improper?

Theaetetus
Not in the least.

Stranger
Well then, must we not, so far as we can, try to learn from those who say that the universe is one1 what they mean when they say “being”?

Theaetetus
Of course we must.

Stranger
Then let them answer this question: Do you say that one only is? We do, they will say; will they not?

Theaetetus
Yes.

Stranger
Well then, do you give the name of being to anything?

Theaetetus
Yes. [244c]

Stranger
Is it what you call “one,” using two names for the same thing, or how is this?

Theaetetus
What is their next answer, Stranger?

Stranger
It is plain, Theaetetus, that he who maintains their theory will not find it the easiest thing in the world to reply to our present question or to any other.

Theaetetus
Why not?

Stranger
It is rather ridiculous to assert that two names exist when you assert that nothing exists but unity.

Theaetetus
Of course it is.

Stranger
And in general there would be no sense in accepting [244d] the statement that a name has any existence.

Theaetetus
Why?

Stranger
Because he who asserts that the name is other than the thing, says that there are two entities.

Theaetetus
Yes.

Stranger
And further, if he asserts that the name is the same as the thing, he will be obliged to say that it is the name of nothing, or if he says it is the name of something, the name will turn out to be the name of a name merely and of nothing else.

Theaetetus
True.

Stranger
And the one will turn out to be the name of one and also the one of the name.2

Theaetetus
Necessarily.

Stranger
And will they say that the whole is other than the one which exists or the same with it? [244e]

Theaetetus
Of course they will and do say it is the same.

Stranger
If then the whole is, as Parmenides says,“On all sides like the mass of a well-rounded sphere, equally weighted in every direction from the middle; for neither greater nor less must needs be on this or that,
Parmenides Fr. 8.43then being, being such as he describes it, has a center and extremes, and, having these, must certainly have parts, must it not?

Theaetetus
Certainly.


1 The Eleatic Zeno and his school.

2 In other words, “one,” considered as a word, will be the name of unity, but considered as a reality, it will be the unity of which the word “one” is the name. The sentence is made somewhat difficult of comprehension, doubtless for the purpose of indicating the confusion caused by the identification of the name wlth the thing.

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    • Basil L. Gildersleeve, Syntax of Classical Greek, The Article
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