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[241a] if it declares that things which are, are not, or that things which are not, are.

Theaetetus
In what other way could a statement be made false?

Stranger
Virtually in no other way; but the sophist will not assent to this. Or how can any reasonable man assent to it, when the expressions we just agreed upon were previously agreed to be inexpressible, unspeakable, irrational, and inconceivable? Do we understand his meaning, Theaetetus?

Theaetetus
Of course we understand that he will say we are contradicting our recent statements, since we dare to say that falsehood exists in opinions and words; [241b] for he will say that we are thus forced repeatedly to attribute being to not-being, although we agreed a while ago that nothing could be more impossible than that.

Stranger
You are quite right to remind me. But I think it is high time to consider what ought to be done about the sophist; for you see how easily and repeatedly he can raise objections and difficulties, if we conduct our search by putting him in the guild of false-workers and jugglers.

Theaetetus
Very true.

Stranger
Yes, we have gone through only a small part of them, [241c] and they are, if I may say so, infinite.

Theaetetus
It would, apparently, be impossible to catch the sophist, if that is the case.

Stranger
Well, then, shall we weaken and give up the struggle now?

Theaetetus
No, I say; we must not do that, if we can in any way get the slightest hold of the fellow.

Stranger
Will you then pardon me, and, as your words imply, be content if I somehow withdraw just for a short distance from this strong argument of his?

Theaetetus
Of course I will. [241d]

Stranger
I have another still more urgent request to make of you.

Theaetetus
What is it?

Stranger
Do not assume that I am becoming a sort of parricide.

Theaetetus
What do you mean?

Stranger
In defending myself I shall have to test the theory of my father Parmenides, and contend forcibly that after a fashion not-being is and on the other hand in a sense being is not.

Theaetetus
It is plain that some such contention is necessary.

Stranger
Yes, plain even to a blind man, as they say; for unless these statements [241e] are either disproved or accepted, no one who speaks about false words, or false opinion—whether images or likenesses or imitations or appearances—about the arts which have to do with them, can ever help being forced to contradict himself and make himself ridiculous.

Theaetetus
Very true.


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