[430a]
for I can ask whether the words he produced would be true, or false, or partly true and partly false. Even that would suffice.Cratylus
I should say that the man in such a case was merely making a noise, going through purposeless motions, as if he were beating a bronze pot.Socrates
Let us see, Cratylus, if we cannot come to terms somehow. You would agree, would you not, that the name is one thing and the thing of which it is the name is another?Cratylus
Yes, I should.Socrates
And you agree that the name is an imitation [430b] of the thing named?Cratylus
Most assuredly.Socrates
And you agree that paintings also are imitations, though in a different way, of things?Cratylus
Yes.Socrates
Well then—for perhaps I do not understand, and you may be right—can both of these imitations, the paintings and the names, be assigned and applied to the things which they imitate, or not? [430c] Cratylus
They can.Socrates
First, then, consider this question: Can we assign the likeness of the man to the man and that of the woman to the woman, and so forth?Cratylus
Certainly.Socrates
And can we conversely attribute that of the man to the woman, and the woman's to the man?Cratylus
That is also possible.Socrates
And are these assignments both correct, or only the former?Cratylus
The former.Socrates
The assignment, in short, which attributes to each that which belongs to it and is like it.Cratylus
That is my view.Socrates
To put an end to contentious argument between you and me, [430d] since we are friends, let me state my position. I call that kind of assignment in the case of both imitations paintings and names—correct, and in the case of names not only correct, but true; and the other kind, which gives and applies the unlike imitation, I call incorrect and, in the case of names, false.Cratylus
But it may be, Socrates, that this incorrect assignment is possible in the case of paintings, and not in the case of names, [430e] which must be always correctly assigned.Socrates
What do you mean? What difference is there between the two? Can I not step up to a man and say to him, “This is your portrait,” and show him perhaps his own likeness or, perhaps, that of a woman? And by “show” I mean bring before the sense of sight.Cratylus
Certainly.Socrates
Well, then, can I not step up to the same man again and say, “This is your name”? A name is an imitation, just as a picture is.
I should say that the man in such a case was merely making a noise, going through purposeless motions, as if he were beating a bronze pot.Socrates
Let us see, Cratylus, if we cannot come to terms somehow. You would agree, would you not, that the name is one thing and the thing of which it is the name is another?Cratylus
Yes, I should.Socrates
And you agree that the name is an imitation [430b] of the thing named?Cratylus
Most assuredly.Socrates
And you agree that paintings also are imitations, though in a different way, of things?Cratylus
Yes.Socrates
Well then—for perhaps I do not understand, and you may be right—can both of these imitations, the paintings and the names, be assigned and applied to the things which they imitate, or not? [430c] Cratylus
They can.Socrates
First, then, consider this question: Can we assign the likeness of the man to the man and that of the woman to the woman, and so forth?Cratylus
Certainly.Socrates
And can we conversely attribute that of the man to the woman, and the woman's to the man?Cratylus
That is also possible.Socrates
And are these assignments both correct, or only the former?Cratylus
The former.Socrates
The assignment, in short, which attributes to each that which belongs to it and is like it.Cratylus
That is my view.Socrates
To put an end to contentious argument between you and me, [430d] since we are friends, let me state my position. I call that kind of assignment in the case of both imitations paintings and names—correct, and in the case of names not only correct, but true; and the other kind, which gives and applies the unlike imitation, I call incorrect and, in the case of names, false.Cratylus
But it may be, Socrates, that this incorrect assignment is possible in the case of paintings, and not in the case of names, [430e] which must be always correctly assigned.Socrates
What do you mean? What difference is there between the two? Can I not step up to a man and say to him, “This is your portrait,” and show him perhaps his own likeness or, perhaps, that of a woman? And by “show” I mean bring before the sense of sight.Cratylus
Certainly.Socrates
Well, then, can I not step up to the same man again and say, “This is your name”? A name is an imitation, just as a picture is.
