[25]
You hear the
law, men of Athens, stating other cases in which suit may not be brought, and in
particular those in which anyone has given a release or discharge.1 And with good reason. For if it is just that suit
may not be brought again for cases which have once been tried, it is far more
just that suit be not allowed for claims in which a discharge has been given.
For a man who has lost his suit in your court might perhaps say that you had
been deceived; but when a man has plainly decided against himself, by giving a
release and discharge, what complaint can he bring against himself that will
give him the right to bring suit again regarding the same matters? None
whatever, of course. Therefore the man who framed this law placed first among
cases in which suit may not be brought all those in which a man has given a
release or discharge. Both of these have been given by the plaintiff; for he has
released and discharged the defendant. That I am speaking the truth, men of
Athens, has been proved to you by the evidence presented.
1 The two verbs ἀφιέναι and ἀπαλλάτειν seem at times to be virtual synonyms, used freely with the redundancy of legal usage. In some cases, however, ἀφιέναι refers clearly to the creditor's act, and ἀπαλλάτειν to the effect on the debtor. Parallel passages are Dem. 37.1 and Dem. 37.19; and Dem. 38.1.
Demosthenes. Demosthenes with an English translation by A. T. Murray, Ph.D., LL.D. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1939.
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