[50]
Observe, gentlemen, that this is a universal distinction: it does not apply
only to questions of homicide. “If a man strike another, giving the
first blow,” says the law. The implication is that he is not guilty,
if the blow was defensive. “If a man revile
another,”—“with false hoods,” the law
adds, implying that, if he speaks the truth, he is justified. “If a
man slay another with malice aforethought,”—indicating that
it is not the same thing if he does it unintentionally. “If a man
injures another with intention, wrongfully.” Everywhere we shall find
that it is the motive that fixes the character of the act. But not with you: you
say, without qualification, “if any man slay Charidemus, he shall be
seized,” though he do it unwittingly, or righteously, or in
self-defence, or for a purpose permitted by law, or in any way whatsoever.
Demosthenes. Demosthenes with an English translation by A. T. Murray, Ph.D., LL.D. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1939.
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