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Then again, we find that there is the same sense and
feeling of cold as of heat; but privation is neither to be
seen, heard, or felt, neither is it known to any of the other
senses. For the object of sense is substance; but where
no substance appears, there we understand privation to
be,—which is a negation of substance, as blindness of
sight, silence of voice, and vacuity of corporeal substance.
For there is no sense or perception of vacuity by feeling;
but where there is no body to be felt, there a vacuity is
implied. Neither do we hear silence; but where we do
not hear any thing at all, there we imply silence. In
like manner we have no perception of blindness, nakedness, or being unarmed; but we know them from the
negation of our sense. Therefore if cold were a privation
of heat, there would be no being sensible of cold; but
[p. 312]
only where heat ceased to be, there cold would be implied.
But if, as heat is perceptible by the warmth and laxative
softness of the flesh, so cold is no less perceptible by the
contraction and condensation of it, it is from thence apparent, that there is some peculiar original and fountain of
cold as well as heat.
Plutarch. Plutarch's Morals. Translated from the Greek by several hands. Corrected and revised by. William W. Goodwin, PH. D. Boston. Little, Brown, and Company. Cambridge. Press Of John Wilson and son. 1874. 5.
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